![A silk banner from Mawangdui, Changsha, Hunan province. It was draped over the coffin of the Lady Dai (d. 168 BCE), wife of the Marquess Li Cang (利蒼) (d. 186 BCE), chancellor for the Kingdom of Changsha.[10] A silk banner from Mawangdui, Changsha, Hunan province. It was draped over the coffin of the Lady Dai (d. 168 BCE), wife of the Marquess Li Cang (利蒼) (d. 186 BCE), chancellor for the Kingdom of Changsha.[10]](http://cdn2.wn.com/pd/93/81/94c7a08b06928a1e8e6ff5db2883_small.jpg)



![A Tang period gilt-silver jar, shaped in the style of northern nomad's leather bag[56] decorated with a horse dancing with a cup of wine in its mouth, as the horses of Emperor Xuanzong were trained to do.[56] A Tang period gilt-silver jar, shaped in the style of northern nomad's leather bag[56] decorated with a horse dancing with a cup of wine in its mouth, as the horses of Emperor Xuanzong were trained to do.[56]](http://cdn0.wn.com/pd/5c/44/94db589b68d5af7028c342defd80_small.jpg)



A policy is typically described as a principle or rule to guide decisions and achieve rational outcome(s). The term is not normally used to denote what is actually done, this is normally referred to as either procedure or protocol. Whereas a policy will contain the 'what' and the 'why', procedures or protocols contain the 'what', the 'how', the 'where', and the 'when'. Policies are generally adopted by the Board of or senior governance body within an organization where as procedures or protocols would be developed and adopted by senior executive officers. Policies can assist in both subjective and objective decision making. Policies to assist in subjective decision making would usually assist senior management with decisions that must consider the relative merits of a number of factors before making decsions and as a result are often hard to objectively test eg. work-life balance policy. In contrast policies to assist in objective decision making are usually operational in nature and can be objectively tested eg. password policy.
A Policy can be considered as a "Statement of Intent" or a "Commitment". For that reason at least, we can be held accountable for our "Policy"
The term may apply to government, private sector organizations and groups, and individuals. Presidential executive orders, corporate privacy policies, and parliamentary rules of order are all examples of policy. Policy differs from rules or law. While law can compel or prohibit behaviors (e.g. a law requiring the payment of taxes on income), policy merely guides actions toward those that are most likely to achieve a desired outcome.
Policy or policy study may also refer to the process of making important organizational decisions, including the identification of different alternatives such as programs or spending priorities, and choosing among them on the basis of the impact they will have. Policies can be understood as political, management, financial, and administrative mechanisms arranged to reach explicit goals.'''
Corporate purchasing policies provide an example of how organizations attempt to avoid negative effects. Many large companies have policies that all purchases above a certain value must be performed through a purchasing process. By requiring this standard purchasing process through policy, the organization can limit waste and standardize the way purchasing is done.
The State of California provides an example of benefit-seeking policy. In recent years, the numbers of hybrid cars in California has increased dramatically, in part because of policy changes in Federal law that provided USD $1,500 in tax credits (since phased out) as well as the use of high-occupancy vehicle lanes to hybrid owners (no longer available for new hybrid vehicles). In this case, the organization (state and/or federal government) created an effect (increased ownership and use of hybrid vehicles) through policy (tax breaks, highway lanes).
The policy formulation process typically includes an attempt to assess as many areas of potential policy impact as possible, to lessen the chances that a given policy will have unexpected or unintended consequences. Because of the nature of some complex adaptive systems such as societies and governments, it may not be possible to assess all possible impacts of a given policy.
An eight step policy cycle is developed in detail in ''The Australian Policy Handbook'' by Peter Bridgman and Glyn Davis: (now with Catherine Althaus in its 4th edition)
# Issue identification # Policy analysis # Policy instrument development # Consultation (which permeates the entire process) # Coordination # Decision # Implementation # Evaluation
The Althaus, Bridgman & Davis model is heuristic and iterative. It is intentionally normative and not meant to be diagnostic or predictive. Policy cycles are typically characterized as adopting a classical approach. Accordingly some postmodern academics challenge cyclical models as unresponsive and unrealistic, preferring systemic and more complex models. They consider a broader range of actors involved in the policy space that includes civil society organisations, the media, intellectuals, think tanks or policy research institutes, corporations, lobbyists, etc.
Some policies may contain additional sections, including:
Policies may be classified in many different ways. The following is a sample of several different types of policies broken down by their effect on members of the organization.
When the term policy is used, it may also refer to:
The actions the organization actually takes may often vary significantly from stated policy. This difference is sometimes caused by political compromise over policy, while in other situations it is caused by lack of policy implementation and enforcement. Implementing policy may have unexpected results, stemming from a policy whose reach extends further than the problem it was originally crafted to address. Additionally, unpredictable results may arise from selective or idiosyncratic enforcement of policy.
Types of policy analysis include:
These qualifiers can be combined, so for example you could have a stationary-memoryless-index policy.
Category:Government * Category:Politics by issue Category:Decision theory
da:Policy de:Policy hi:नीति id:Kebijakan it:Policy (politica) nl:Beleid ja:政策 ko:정책 sv:Policy yi:פאליסי zh:政策This text is licensed under the Creative Commons CC-BY-SA License. This text was originally published on Wikipedia and was developed by the Wikipedia community.
The group issues statements on human rights issues and its website provides news and background information.
Category:Human rights in the People's Republic of China Category:Human rights activists
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Chen was released from prison on September 8, 2010 after serving his full sentence, but remains under "ruanjin" or soft detention at his home in Dongshigu. Chen and his wife were reportedly beaten shortly after a human rights group released a video of their home under intense police surveillance on February 9, 2011.
Chen filed a class-action lawsuit on the women's behalf against Linyi officials and drew attention to the plight of the villagers. He also traveled to Beijing in June 2005 to seek redress. Although the suit he filed was rejected, the incident was publicised on the Internet and by the ''Time'' magazine who interviewed Chen. This prompted the National Population and Family Planning Commission to launch an investigation in August 2005. A month later, the Commission announced that several Linyi officials were detained.
According to a report by the ''Washington Post'', a campaign was launched by local officials to portray Chen as working for "foreign anti-China forces" and that he received foreign funding. Chinese authorities often use this rhetoric to sway public opinion in similar cases even though it is not often true.
According to an article in ''Time'' by Hannah Beech, “Chen Guangcheng, A Blind Man with Legal Vision,” Chen met with Time reporters to discuss the forced abortion cases when he thought authorities would take action. "Yet three hours after meeting with TIME in Beijing to discuss the issue, Chen was shoved into an unmarked vehicle by public-security agents from his hometown. They bundled him back to his village, where he was held under house arrest for months. Despite the commission's vow, only one official has been detained. Meanwhile, thugs routinely showed up at Chen's home to rough him up." In April, ''Time'' named Chen one of the 100 people most influential in shaping our world.
Chen was removed from his house in March 2006 and was formally detained in June 2006 by Yinan county official. He was scheduled to stand trial on July 17, 2006 on charges of destruction of property and assembling a crowd to disrupt traffic., but this was delayed at the request of the prosecution. According to Radio Free Asia and Chinese Rights Defenders (CRD), a network of Chinese citizens who are committed to safeguarding rights and their international volunteer supporters, prosecution delayed the trial because a crowd of Chen supporters gathered outside the courthouse. With only a few days notice, authorities rescheduled Chen's trial for August 18, 2006.
On the eve of his trial, all three of his lawyers were detained by Yinan police. Two were released after being questioned and their phones confiscated. Xu Zhiyong of the Yitong Law Firm, perhaps the lawyer with the most knowledge of the forced abortion cases Chen was working on, was detained after authorities accused him of stealing a man's wallet. He was not released until the trial concluded on the 18th. None of Chen's lawyers were allowed in the courtroom for the trial. Only Chen's brothers were allowed inside. Not even Chen's wife was allowed to hear proceedings. Instead, authorities appointed their own public defender for Chen just before the trial began. As a result, the defender had not even read the case report before he walked into the courtroom. The defender did little to help his new client's case and did not raise any objection to the proceedings or to any of the evidence presented, despite Chen's protest in the court. The trial lasted just two hours. On August 24, 2006, Chen was sentenced to four years and three months for "damaging property and organising a mob to disturb traffic".
On November 30, 2006, Yinan County court in Shandong province upheld its decision to sentence blind activist Chen Guangcheng to more than four years in prison after he documented claims of forced abortions, the activist's brother said.
The decision was issued in a 30-minute session, where no witnesses or evidence were presented, said Chen Guangfu, the only family member allowed to be present during the proceedings.
On January 12, 2007, the Linyi Intermediate Court in Shandong Province rejected Chen's final appeal. The same court had overturned his original conviction in December 2006 citing lack of evidence. However, Chen was convicted in a second trial on identical charges and given an identical sentence by the Yinan court.
On August 24, 2007, AIDS activist Hu Jia reported that Yuan Weijing's passport had been revoked and her mobile phone confiscated by Chinese authorities as she attempted to pass the security cordon at Beijing airport. Weijing was on her way to the Philippines to attend the Magsaysay Award ceremony and receive the prize on behalf of her husband, Chen Guangcheng.
Category:1971 births Category:Chinese activists Category:Prisoners and detainees of the People's Republic of China Category:Chinese human rights activists Category:Living people Category:Blind people
de:Chen Guangcheng fr:Chen Guangcheng fi:Chen Guangcheng ta:சென் குவாங்செங் zh:陈光诚This text is licensed under the Creative Commons CC-BY-SA License. This text was originally published on Wikipedia and was developed by the Wikipedia community.
According to his website, his earlier postings included Cambodia (where he served during the war in 1973-74), Malaysia and Washington, DC, and he was Permanent Secretary at the Foreign Ministry from 1993 to 1998. He is currently in the Board of Governors of the Institute of Policy Studies. Mahbubani has also served on the boards of leading institutes and think tanks in Singapore, such as the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, the Institute of Policy Studies, the Lee Kuan Yew Exchange Fellowship and the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies.
The President's Scholarship was awarded to Mahbubani in 1967, for him to delve into philosophy as an undergraduate in University of Singapore (now known as the National University of Singapore or NUS). Later in 1976, he also obtained a Master's degree in philosophy and was awarded an honorary doctorate in 1995, both from Dalhousie University. In addition, he was a fellow at the Center for International Affairs at Harvard University in 1991-92.
Mahbubani is best known outside Singapore for his writings in journals such as Foreign Affairs and in the books ''Can Asians Think?'' and ''Beyond the Age of Innocence: Rebuilding Trust between America and the World''. His articles have appeared in several leading journals and newspapers outside of Singapore, such as The New York Times and Wall Street Journal.
He is the son of Hindu-Sindhi Indian parents. Mahbubani himself has three children.
In 2006 he was appointed Chair of the United World College of South East Asia board of governors. Mahbubani spoke at the graduation ceremony for the class of 2007, focusing on the competitive advantage they now have as graduates of a United World College in Asia.
In 2008, he was interviewed on BBC Television's HardTalk. He asserted that Asia was ascending at a time the West, in particular the United States, was declining.
He was a keynote speaker at the ''Science & Technology Summit'' in The Hague on November 18, 2010.
Category:1948 births Category:Living people Category:Singaporean diplomats Category:Singaporean Hindus Category:Sindhi people Category:Harvard Fellows Category:Ambassadors of Singapore Category:Presidents of the United Nations Security Council Category:Permanent Representatives of Singapore to the United Nations Category:National University of Singapore faculty Category:Saint Andrew's School, Singapore alumni Category:Singaporean people of Pakistani descent
de:Kishore Mahbubani nl:Kishore Mahbubani pl:Kishore MahbubaniThis text is licensed under the Creative Commons CC-BY-SA License. This text was originally published on Wikipedia and was developed by the Wikipedia community.
Recent Chinese foreign policy makers may be seen to adhere to the realist rather than the liberal school of international relations theory. Thus, in sharp contrast to the Soviet Union and the United States, China has not been devoted to advancing any higher international ideological interests such as world communism or world democracy since the Cold War; that is, ideology appears to be secondary to advancing its national interest. China is a member of many international organizations; holding key positions such as a permanent member on the UN Security Council and is a leader in many areas such as non-proliferation, peacekeeping and resolving regional conflicts.
Unlike most other nations, much of Chinese foreign policy is formulated in think tanks sponsored and supervised by, but formally outside of the government. One distinctive aspect of Sino-American relations is that much of the foreign policy discussion takes place between interlocutors who form the think tanks. Because these discussions are unofficial, they are generally more free and less restricted than discussions between government officials. China is also distinctive for having a separate body of Chinese strategic thought and theory of international relations which is distinct from Western theory.
Both the PRC and ROC make it a prerequisite for diplomatic relations that a country does not recognize and conduct any official relations with the other party.
After its founding, China's foreign policy initially focused on its solidarity with the Soviet Union, the Eastern Bloc nations, and other communist countries, sealed with, among other agreements, the China-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance signed in 1950 to oppose China's chief antagonists, the West and in particular the United States. The 1950–53 Korean War waged by China and its North Korea ally against the United States, South Korea, and United Nations (UN) forces has long been a reason for bitter feelings. After the conclusion of the Korean War, China sought to balance its identification as a member of the Soviet bloc by establishing friendly relations with Pakistan and other Third World countries, particularly in Southeast Asia.
By the late 1950s, relations between China and the Soviet Union had become so divisive that in 1960, the Soviets unilaterally withdrew their advisers from China. The two then began to vie for allegiances among the developing world nations, for China saw itself as a natural champion through its role in the Non-Aligned Movement and its numerous bilateral and bi-party ties. In the 1960s, Beijing competed with Moscow for political influence among communist parties and in the developing world generally. In 1962, China had a brief war with India over a border dispute. By 1969, relations with Moscow were so tense that fighting erupted along their common border. Following the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and clashes in 1969 on the Sino-Soviet border, Chinese competition with the Soviet Union increasingly reflected concern over China's own strategic position. China then lessened its anti-Western rhetoric and began developing formal diplomatic relations with West European nations.
Around the same time, in 1971, that Beijing succeeded in gaining China's seat in the UN (thus ousting the Republic of China on Taiwan), relations with the United States began to thaw. In 1972, President Richard M. Nixon visited China. Formal diplomatic relations were established in 1978, and the two nations have experienced more than a quarter century of varying degrees of amiable or wary relations over such contentious issues as Taiwan, trade balances, intellectual property rights, nuclear proliferation, and human rights.
In late 1978, the Chinese also became concerned over Vietnam's efforts to establish open control over Laos and Cambodia. In response to the Soviet-backed Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, China fought a war with Vietnam (February–March 1979).
Chinese anxiety about Soviet strategic advances was heightened following the Soviet Union's December 1979 invasion of Afghanistan. Sharp differences between China and the Soviet Union persisted over Soviet support for Vietnam's continued occupation of Cambodia, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and Soviet troops along the Sino-Soviet border and in Mongolia--the so-called "three obstacles" to improved Sino-Soviet relations.
In the 1970s and 1980s, China sought to create a secure regional and global environment for itself and to foster good relations with countries that could aid its economic development. To this end, China looked to the West for assistance with its modernization drive and for help in countering Soviet expansionism, which it characterized as the greatest threat to its national security and to world peace.
China maintained its consistent opposition to "superpower hegemonism," focusing almost exclusively on the expansionist actions of the Soviet Union and Soviet proxies such as Vietnam and Cuba, but it also placed growing emphasis on a foreign policy independent of both the U.S. and the Soviet Union. While improving ties with the West, China continued to closely follow the political and economic positions of the Third World Non-Aligned Movement, although China was not a formal member.
In the immediate aftermath of Tiananmen crackdown in June 1989, many countries reduced their diplomatic contacts with China as well as their economic assistance programs. In response, China worked vigorously to expand its relations with foreign countries, and by late 1990, had reestablished normal relations with almost all nations. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in late 1991, China also opened diplomatic relations with the republics of the former Soviet Union.
In recent years, China's leaders have been regular travelers to all parts of the globe, and it has sought a higher profile in the UN through its permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council and other multilateral organizations.
Closer to home, China has made efforts to reduce tensions in Asia; its relations with its Asian neighbors have become stable during the last decades of the 20th century. It has contributed to stability on the Korean Peninsula, cultivated a more cooperative relationship with members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (Brunei, Cambodia, Myanmar, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam), and participated in the ASEAN Regional Forum. In 1997, the ASEAN member nations and the People's Republic of China, South Korea and Japan agreed to hold yearly talks to further strengthen regional cooperation, the ASEAN Plus Three meetings. In 2005, the "ASEAN Plus Three" countries together with India, Australia and New Zealand held the inaugural East Asia Summit (EAS). Relations have improved with Vietnam since a border war was fought with the one-time close ally in 1979. A territorial dispute with its Southeast Asian neighbors over islands in the South China Sea remains unresolved, as does another dispute in the East China Sea with Japan.
China has improved ties with Russia. President Putin and President Jiang, in large part to serve as a counterbalance to the United States, signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in July 2001. The two also joined with the Central Asian nations of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan to found the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in June 2001. The SCO is designed to promote regional stability and cooperate to combat terrorism in the region.
Relations with India have also improved considerably. After years of competition, general distrust between the two (mostly over China's close relationship with Pakistan and India's with the former Soviet Union) and a border war, relations in the 21st century between the world's two most populous states have never been more harmonious, as they have started to collaborate in several economic and strategic areas. Both countries have doubled their economic trade in the past few years, and China became India's largest trading partner in 2010. The two countries are planning to host joint naval exercises. In 2003, China and India held negotiations for the first time since the Sino-Indian War of 1962 on a major border dispute: however, the dispute over Aksai Chin and South Tibet is not settled, and plagues Sino-India relations. While New Delhi has raised objections to Chinese military-aid to arch-rival Pakistan and neighboring Bangladesh, Beijing similarly objects to India's growing military collaboration with Japan, Australia and the United States.
China has border and maritime disputes, including with Vietnam in the Gulf of Tonkin and with Japan. Beijing has resolved many of these disputes. Notably on July 21, 2008, it finally resolved the last remaining border dispute it had with Russia with Russia ceding a small amount of territory to China. There is now no border dispute between Russia and China along their 4300 km border. China also reached a 2000 agreement with Vietnam to resolve some differences over their maritime border, though disagreements remain over some islands in the South China Sea.
During the late 1990s and early 21st century, Chinese foreign policy appeared to be focused on improving relations with Russia and Europe to counterbalance the United States. This strategy was based on the premise that the United States was a hyperpower whose influence could be checked through alliances with other powers, such as Russia or the European Union. This assessment of United States power was reconsidered after the United States intervention in Kosovo, and as the 20th century drew to a close, the discussion among thinktanks in China involved how to reorient Chinese foreign policy in a unipolar world. This discussion also occurred in the context of China's new security concept, which argued that the post–Cold War era required nations to move away from thinking in terms of alliances and power blocs and toward thinking in terms of economic and diplomatic cooperation.
China had long been a close ally of North Korea but also found a valuable trading partner in South Korea and eventually took a role in the early 2000s as a proponent of "six-party talks" (North Korea, South Korea, Russia, Japan, the United States, and China) to resolve tensions on the Korean Peninsula. China was instrumental at brokering talks with North Korea over its nuclear program, and in 2003, there was a concerted effort by China to improve relations with the ASEAN nations and form a common East Asian market. These foreign policy efforts have been part of a general foreign policy initiative known as China's peaceful rise. On November 15, 2005, Hu Jintao visited Seoul and spoke of the importance of both countries' contributions for regional peace and cooperation in economic development.
However, China's opposition to the bid of two of its important neighbors—India and Japan—to become permanent members of the United Nations Security Council has proved to be an irritant in their respective relationships. Japan, with its large economic and cultural influences in Asia, is seen by China as its most formidable opponent and partner in regional diplomacy. The two sides established diplomatic relations in 1972, and Japanese investment in China was important in the early years of China's economic reforms and ever since. Having fought two wars against Japan (1894–95 and 1936–45), China's long-standing concern about the level of Japan's military strength surfaces periodically, and criticism of Japan's refusal to present a full version of the atrocities of World War II in its textbooks is a perennial issue.
At a national meeting on diplomatic work in August 2004, China's President Hu Jintao reiterated that China will continue its "independent foreign policy of peaceful development," stressing the need for a peaceful and stable international environment, especially among China's neighbors, that will foster "mutually beneficial cooperation" and "common development." This policy line has varied little in intent since the People's Republic was established in 1949, but the rhetoric has varied in its stridency to reflect periods of domestic political upheaval.
In 2005, there has been talk of the European Union lifting its arms embargo, however the United States has objected to this.
Foreign ministry spokesman Qin Gang made a statement about the eight-point diplomatic philosophy of the People's Republic of China:
#China will not seek hegemony. China is still a developing country and has no resources to seek hegemony. Even if China becomes a developed country, it will not seek hegemony. #China will not play power politics and will not interfere with other countries' internal affairs. China will not impose its own ideology on other countries. #China maintains all countries, big or small, should be treated equally and respect each other. All affairs should be consulted and resolved by all countries on the basis of equal participation. No country should bully others on the basis of strength. #China will make judgment on each case in international affairs, each matter on the merit of the matter itself and it will not have double standards. China will not have two policies: one for itself and one for others. China believes that it cannot do unto others what they do not wish others do unto them. #China advocates that all countries handle their relations on the basis of the United Nations Charter and norms governing international relations. China advocates stepping up international cooperation and is against unilateral politics. China should not undermine the dignity and the authority of the U.N. China should not impose and set its own wishes above the U.N. Charter, international law and norms. #China advocates peaceful negotiation and consultation so as to resolve its international disputes. China does not resort to force, or threat of force, in resolving international disputes. China maintains a reasonable national military buildup to defend its own sovereignty and territorial integrity. It is not made to expand, nor does it seek invasion or aggression. #China is firmly opposed to terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. China is a responsible member of the international community, and as for international treaties, China abides by all them in a faithful way. China never plays by a double standard, selecting and discarding treaties it does not need. #China respects the diversity of civilization and the whole world. China advocates different cultures make exchanges, learn from each other, and complement one another with their own strengths. China is opposed to clashes and confrontations between civilizations, and China does not link any particular ethnic group or religion with terrorism.
In 2011, Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi outlined plans for an "integrated approach" that would serve China's economic development.
===International territorial disputes=== Territorial disputes with other countries include:
Bloomberg News reports that these disputes are undermining China's attempts to charm its neighbors away from American influence.
US State Department Tier rating: Tier 2 Watch List - "China failed to show evidence of increasing efforts to address transnational trafficking; while the government provides reasonable protection to internal victims of trafficking, protection for Chinese and foreign victims of transnational trafficking remain inadequate."
Membership in International Organizations:
China holds a permanent seat, which affords it veto power, on the Security Council of the United Nations (UN). Prior to 1971, the Republic of China on Taiwan held China's UN seat, but, as of that date, the People's Republic of China successfully lobbied for Taiwan's removal from the UN and took control of the seat.
China is an active member of numerous UN system organizations, including the UN General Assembly and Security Council; Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN; UN Conference on Trade and Development; UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; UN Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees; UN Industrial Development Organization; UN Institute for Training and Research; UN Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission; and UN Truce Supervision Organization.
China also holds memberships in the African Development Bank, Asian Development Bank, Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (dialogue partner), Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum, Bank for International Settlements, Caribbean Development Bank, Group of 20, Group of 77, International Atomic Energy Agency, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, International Chamber of Commerce, International Civil Aviation Organization, International Criminal Police Organization, International Development Association, International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, International Finance Corporation, International Fund for Agricultural Development, International Hydrographic Organization, International Labour Organization, International Maritime Organization, International Monetary Fund, International Olympic Committee, International Organization for Migration (observer), International Organization for Standardization, International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, International Telecommunication Union, Latin American Integration Association (observer), Non-Aligned Movement (observer), Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Permanent Court of Arbitration, Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Universal Postal Union, World Customs Organization, World Health Organization, World Intellectual Property Organization, World Meteorological Organization, World Tourism Organization, World Trade Organization, and Zangger Committee.
Treaties signed on behalf of China before 1949 are applicable only to the Republic of China on Taiwan. Conventions signed by Beijing include: Assistance in Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency Convention; Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention; Chemical Weapons Convention; Conventional Weapons Convention; Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident Convention; Inhumane Weapons Convention; Nuclear Dumping Convention (London Convention); Nuclear Safety Convention; Physical Protection of Nuclear Material Convention; Rights of the Child and on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution, and Child Pornography Convention (signed Optional Protocol); and Status of Refugees Convention (and the 1967 Protocol).
Treaties include the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (signed but not ratified); Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous, or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (Geneva Protocol); Treaty on the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (Treaty of Pelindaba, signed protocols 1 and 2); Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; Treaty on Outer Space; Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco, signed Protocol 2); Treaty on Seabed Arms Control; and Treaty on the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone (Treaty of Rarotonga, signed and ratified protocols 2 and 3).
China also is a party to the following international environmental conventions: Antarctic-Environmental Protocol, Antarctic Treaty, Biodiversity, Climate Change, Climate Change-Kyoto Protocol, Desertification, Endangered Species, Hazardous Wastes, Law of the Sea, Marine Dumping, Ozone Layer Protection, Ship Pollution, Tropical Timber 83, Tropical Timber 94, Wetlands, and Whaling.
China's fast economic growth also means that it is consuming ever more energy. China is now the first largest consumer of petroleum products in the world after the United States. China has recently been carrying out a foreign policy in trying to secure and diversify sources of its energy (oil and natural gas) supplies from around the world. The Middle Eastern region, which contains the world's largest proven oil reserve, has been the focus of that policy. Roughly half of China's imported oil comes from the Middle East.
At the same time, these energy-producing Middle Eastern nations are keen to diversify their customer base away from over dependence on the Western market (Europe and North America) as a demand source and so they have begun to look at other rapidly growing markets such as China. In addition to the deepening bilateral relationship in the trade and energy sectors, China has an expanding body of other strategic interests in the greater Middle East region. This is manifested in its security relationships with Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Iran, which entail WMD and ballistic missile cooperation. Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Pakistan are pivotal states in the region. They are increasingly likely to view China in coming years as an alternative source of security and as a counterbalance to American power.
Relations stem from diplomatic overtures made between Deng Xiaoping and Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto during the 1970s. More recently, China has signed several free trade agreements with Pakistan as well as several bilateral trade agreements such as the Early Harvest Agreement and the establishment of a duty free export zone in Pakistan's Northern Area's. Pakistan and China continue to remain the strongest of allies and trade and contacts have steadily increased over the years. China continues to invest heavily into Pakistan, and is providing assistance in the development of that country's 2nd major port at Gwadar as well as improving infrastructure and the development of a pipeline from the said port towards China's western regions. Cultural exchange was high, especially during the 70s, and the 90s. Trade and goodwill between citizens remain strong especially due to the bordered Muslims area of Xinjiang, who used Pakistan as a transit to Makkah for pilgrimage. Pakistani students go to China to study while Chinese workers come to Pakistan to work on infrastructure projects. Pakistan ceded a portion of Kashmir to China and both sides have no territorial disputes what so ever. They also share the Karakoram highway, the highest paved road in the world. China and Pakistan have and have believed to have collaborated on everything from Nuclear and space technology where help was provided by China to Pakistan, to cruise missile and naval technology, where Pakistan helped China get hold of western technology which it could otherwise not acquire.
China's bilateral trade with India accounts for US$13.6 billion a year, a number set to grow to US$25 billion in 2010., but its relations have been troubled because of territorial disputes and past conflicts.
Beijing runs trade surpluses with many partners, specifically Pakistan, however, also with Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka. Fast on the heels of the U.S. offer of nuclear power plants to India, China has offered Pakistan nuclear power plants of its own to meet its energy needs. Beijing also assists South Asian nations with low-cost financial capital, to help their development sector, especially with the current economically struggling countries of Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Nepal
Historically, China's relations with the region has been uneasy, due to the country's involvement with the Vietnam War, the Malayan Communist Party during Malayan Emergency and Communist Insurgency War in Malaysia, as well as the Communist Party of Indonesia and 30 September Movement in Indonesia. As a result, previously friendly relations with Indonesia under the Sukarno government broke off in 1967, and were not restored until 1990, while diplomatic relations with Malaysia were not established until 1974. China's conflict with the government of Vietnam over the support of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia resulted in the Sino-Vietnamese War and other border conflicts. China's relationship with Singapore is good, and the latter is one of only three countries that can enjoy visa-free entry to the country.
Caribbean regional relations with People's Republic of China are mostly based on trade, credits, and investments which have increased significantly since the 1990s. For many Caribbean nations the increasing ties with China have been used as a way to decrease long time over-dependence on the United States.
Additionally, China's policy in the region was the use of "dollar diplomacy" or the attempts to switch many nations from recognizing Taiwan as an independent nation instead to the recognition of the "One China" policy in exchange for Chinese investment.
More recently, during various visits by several Chinese diplomats to the Caribbean region a deal was signed for China to help establish the Confucius Institute at the Mona Campus of the University of the West Indies, with a possible additional one to be establish at the Cave Hill Campus. These agreements are part of the basis of teaching Mandarin Chinese language courses at the regional University.
fr:Politique étrangère de la Chine ja:中華人民共和国の国際関係 pt:Relações exteriores da República Popular da China zh:中华人民共和国外交
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The World News (WN) Network, has created this privacy statement in order to demonstrate our firm commitment to user privacy. The following discloses our information gathering and dissemination practices for wn.com, as well as e-mail newsletters.
We do not collect personally identifiable information about you, except when you provide it to us. For example, if you submit an inquiry to us or sign up for our newsletter, you may be asked to provide certain information such as your contact details (name, e-mail address, mailing address, etc.).
When you submit your personally identifiable information through wn.com, you are giving your consent to the collection, use and disclosure of your personal information as set forth in this Privacy Policy. If you would prefer that we not collect any personally identifiable information from you, please do not provide us with any such information. We will not sell or rent your personally identifiable information to third parties without your consent, except as otherwise disclosed in this Privacy Policy.
Except as otherwise disclosed in this Privacy Policy, we will use the information you provide us only for the purpose of responding to your inquiry or in connection with the service for which you provided such information. We may forward your contact information and inquiry to our affiliates and other divisions of our company that we feel can best address your inquiry or provide you with the requested service. We may also use the information you provide in aggregate form for internal business purposes, such as generating statistics and developing marketing plans. We may share or transfer such non-personally identifiable information with or to our affiliates, licensees, agents and partners.
We may retain other companies and individuals to perform functions on our behalf. Such third parties may be provided with access to personally identifiable information needed to perform their functions, but may not use such information for any other purpose.
In addition, we may disclose any information, including personally identifiable information, we deem necessary, in our sole discretion, to comply with any applicable law, regulation, legal proceeding or governmental request.
We do not want you to receive unwanted e-mail from us. We try to make it easy to opt-out of any service you have asked to receive. If you sign-up to our e-mail newsletters we do not sell, exchange or give your e-mail address to a third party.
E-mail addresses are collected via the wn.com web site. Users have to physically opt-in to receive the wn.com newsletter and a verification e-mail is sent. wn.com is clearly and conspicuously named at the point of
collection.If you no longer wish to receive our newsletter and promotional communications, you may opt-out of receiving them by following the instructions included in each newsletter or communication or by e-mailing us at michaelw(at)wn.com
The security of your personal information is important to us. We follow generally accepted industry standards to protect the personal information submitted to us, both during registration and once we receive it. No method of transmission over the Internet, or method of electronic storage, is 100 percent secure, however. Therefore, though we strive to use commercially acceptable means to protect your personal information, we cannot guarantee its absolute security.
If we decide to change our e-mail practices, we will post those changes to this privacy statement, the homepage, and other places we think appropriate so that you are aware of what information we collect, how we use it, and under what circumstances, if any, we disclose it.
If we make material changes to our e-mail practices, we will notify you here, by e-mail, and by means of a notice on our home page.
The advertising banners and other forms of advertising appearing on this Web site are sometimes delivered to you, on our behalf, by a third party. In the course of serving advertisements to this site, the third party may place or recognize a unique cookie on your browser. For more information on cookies, you can visit www.cookiecentral.com.
As we continue to develop our business, we might sell certain aspects of our entities or assets. In such transactions, user information, including personally identifiable information, generally is one of the transferred business assets, and by submitting your personal information on Wn.com you agree that your data may be transferred to such parties in these circumstances.